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Since 1963 Turkey has been struggling to join the European Union (EU). Despite
strong Turkish aspirations, it appears unlikely that Turkey will be accepted as an EU
member in the near future due to Turkey's shortcomings in its political, economic and
social structure. Applications submitted prior to December 1999, were rejected by the EU
Commission on the basis of poor democracy, human rights abuses, restrictions on
political and cultural rights, a high level of influence of the Turkish military in political
affairs, weak economy, and disputes with Greece and the Cyprus problem. The EU has
certain criteria for membership: a functioning democracy, respect for rule of law,
protection of minority and human rights, functioning market economy and settlement of
disputes with other member states prior to accession. Turkey is seeking an immediate EU
membership to improve economy and democratization, and take an undisputable place
inside the European order and civilization. To this end, Turkey has to adopt the necessary
reforms and regulations that will help strengthen democracy, economy and social and
cultural rights in Turkey. However, Turkey's present domestic infrastructure does not
provide a suitable situation to commence key radical political reforms in the immediate
future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the first application of Turkey for membership of the European Union (EU)
in 1963, Turkey has waited patiently while other states, not subject to the same conditions
set by the EU for Turkey, have been accepted as members. Despite the fact that Turkey
strongly desires to join the EU, Turkey is potentially the last country in Europe expected
to gain membership in the EU, because of its short and long-term domestic and
international problems, such as poor democracy, insufficient economic capacity,
problems with Greece in the Aegean Sea and the divided status of Cyprus after the
Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974.
The end of the Cold War created new concerns over Turkish accession into the
EU. The newly freed countries of Eastern Europe from the Soviet hegemony have applied
for the EU membership and jumped the line before Turkey. The EU has made it clear that
the enlargement of the EU to include these Central and Eastern European countries is a
moral obligation and a historical opportunity for a stable, peaceful, prosperous Europe.
This new environment made the process ofjoining the EU more complex for Turkey.
Currently 12 countries and Turkey are waiting for the entrance into the EU (see Figure 1
on page 2).
After the end of the Cold War, Turkey's strategic importance in the defense and
security system of Europe decreased in terms of preventing any possible Soviet threat,
since the Soviet Union no more exists, but on the other hand, the strategic importance of
Turkey also increased to provide and keep the peace and stability in the southeastern
flank of Europe, because of ongoing conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Northern
































Figure 1 : The Enlargement Process of the European Union (The EU has not started
Accession Talks with Turkey yet.)
From Ref. [Shaping the Union, The Economist
,
07 December 2000].
During 1990s, the EU began to structure itself as the civic society of Europe with
its own interpretations and visions of democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of
minority rights, and market economy. Since this development in European societal
structure, relations between EU and Turkey have taken a form for the worse. Turkey's
domestic issues, which were not previously regarded as roadblocks for the integration of
Turkey into Europe, have became major obstacles for Turkish accession into the EU.
The rise of radical Islam and the separatist Kurdish movement currently pose
major threats to the stability of Turkey. In this respect, according to Turkish politicians
and military leaders, Turkey lives a high-stakes dilemma, in which the Turkish
government must choose between adopting regulations that promote respect for
individual rights, protection of minorities, respect for human rights and rule of law, or
experience a huge insurgency (including the possible disintegration of the state caused by
separatist actions) and the instability caused by radical Islamic movement. 1
In regard to finding a solution to this dilemma, the Turkish Military plays a major
role in shaping the policies designed to alleviate the crises. Because of this powerful
influence, the role of the Turkish military in governing Turkish society is another primary
concern for the EU in assuring itself of the status of Turkey's democracy.
Two other major EU concerns about Turkey are its relations with Greece and the
historical debate over the ownership of Cyprus. Although Turkey's relations with Greece
have strengthened after the devastating earthquakes in both countries in 1999, the major
problems between two countries are still expected to be addressed by two countries and
McBride, E., Survey: Turkey- the Last Line of Defence, The Economist, p. 13, London, 10 June 2000.
the EU. The other matter of concern, which is also related to Greece, is the divided status
of Cyprus.
Turkish motivations for joining the EU have various political, economic, defense
and sociological sources. With Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey
and president until his death in 1938, Turkey has advanced rapidly in the process of
westernization—a process that has continued until now. Most of the Turkish intellectuals
regard Turkey as a European country. But some political groups, especially the Islamic
faction, see Turkey as an Islamic oriented country. Some western intellectuals, including
Samuel Huntington, a well-known author in the United States of America, have also
pointed out the oriental-based, divided cultural structure of Turkey. 2 Nevertheless, for
many Turks, the EU represents Europe, and EU membership will confirm the acceptance
of Turkey's status as a European country.
Because of its geographical location, Turkey has a critical place in the defense of
Europe. Eventhough, Turkey has not acquired EU membership yet, Turkey is already
playing an important role in European affairs as a member ofNATO and many Western
European organizations such as the European Council, Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and Western European Union (WEU). Moreover, the EU has
granted Turkey the candidacy status in its Helsinki Summit in December 1999.
Turkey is pushing hard to gain acceptance into the EU. Applications submitted
prior to December 1999, were rejected by EU Commission on the basis of:
• Weak democratic institutions and low respect for rule of law;
"Huntington, S. P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp. 144-145, New York, A
Touchstone Book, 1997.
• Human rights abuses;
• Abuses and suppression of the political-social and cultural rights of its
Kurdish originated citizens;
• High level of influence of the Turkish military in political affairs;
• Weak economy; and
• Disputes with Greece and the Cyprus problem.
Other than these official reasons, there are additional political, institutional, cultural and
economic reasons preventing Turkish accession into the EU, evolving from the EU itself
or from EU member states.
The following questions will form the theoretical basis for the unresolved debates
investigated in this thesis: (1) Where is Turkey's place in the complex European
organization? (2) Is Turkey really part of Europe? and, (3)Why does Turkey have such a
low priority in the European's list of potential candidates to gain acceptance into the EU?
This thesis will argue that Turkey has no real alternative other than to join the EU,
despite tremendous obstacles, (which are mainly domestic). This thesis will also argue
that, with its historical and current ties to Europe, Turkey is a European country.
However, its full integration into the European Union will be a difficult and lengthy one
due to Turkey's short and long-term problems and the EU's policies.
This paper will be organized in five chapters. The questions of what EU and
Europe means to Turkey, and Turkey's place in contemporary European society are the
main focus of the Introduction, and will lay out the theoretical basis for thesis. The
second chapter deals with the EU regulations and policies about enlargement, the EU's
membership criteria for the applicants, and the policies and problems within the EU
preventing an early accession of Turkey.
The third chapter will discuss the obstacles that prevent acceptance of Turkey into
the EU in detail. I will examine the current status of the problems vis a " vis the EU
requirements and the Turkish government's plan to make the necessary regulations
through laws.
The fourth chapter will examine how each party could gain mutual benefits from
Turkish accession into the EU. What aspects of the EU are the most attractive for Turkey,
and could Turkey use EU membership to settle its long lasting problems? This chapter
will also briefly address the current status of Turkey's other international relations in the
region.
The fifth chapter will conclude that EU membership for Turkey is, and will
continue to be a top priority, and will enable Turkey to thrive as a modern, prosperous,
democratic and stable European country. To this end, both the EU and Turkey should
engage in mutual recognition of their respective expectations, challenges and policies for
a stronger Europe.
II. EU POLICIES ON ENLARGEMENT AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP
A. GENERAL POLICIES
The European Union is aiming to reach two major goals by integrating Europe.
As the European Commissioner for enlargement Gunter Verhaugen stated one is reaching
to the Civil Europe that provides peace and stability by guaranteeing democracy, rule of
law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities. The other is creating a market
that is open and competitive. 3
In Europe the main source of integration had always been some kind of conflict,
which in each case had destroyed much of Europe. So, not surprisingly, when it was
established after World War II, the first objective of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was to eliminate the causes that could result in another European
war, particularly between Germany and France. In this point Gunter Verhaugen also
states that, "The process of enlargement is instrumental for solving minority problems
and border disputes and is instrumental for the solution of conflicts between neighboring
countries. . . The best way to make Europe a safer place where the nightmares of the past
will really disappear is to go ahead with full integration of the European continent."
4
In addition to preventing any possible future European war, an enlargement of the
EU throughout Eastern Europe has serious historical, cultural, social, political and
economic implications for all current and prospective EU members. During the 1993
Copenhagen Summit, in Copenhagen, Denmark, the EU decided to admit ten countries
J Guttman, R. J., European Commissioner for Enlargement: Gunter Verheugen




with a combined total population of 105 million (see Table 2 on page 79). 5 These
countries, with low GDPs and GDPs per capita (see Table 1 on page 78), (about one third
the EU average) are poorer, and highly diverse in terms of language, religion, ethnic
structure, and historical traditions.6
Political integration implies the uniform adoption ofcommon democratic values
such as democracy, liberalism, rule of law, protection of individual and minority rights
and respect for human rights, EU Citizenship, common laws on governmental issues,
common defense and security policies and even a European Constitution. 7
From the economic perspective, the integration of new candidates into the EU
both may entail benefits and costs, especially during the transition period from state
controlled economy to a market economy. There would be a considerable financial
burden, for the EU to help candidates to align their economic, social and political systems
with the EU standards. Moreover, it is clear that an enlargement of this scale will
constitute unpredictable results for European institutions, interests, policies and the
balance of power.
To date, the EU has experienced three major enlargements. The first was the
accession of United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973. The second was the
entrance of Greece, Spain and Portugal in 1981 and 1986, respectively. The last was the
inclusion of Finland, Austria and Sweden in 1995. The only country, which has refused
joining the EU by referendum was Norway in 1994.





Our constitution for Europe, The Economist, London, 26 October 2000.
S
Although historically the time frame for approval of applications has varied for all
applicants, the EU has not been faced with such a large list of candidates with complex
and potentially unstable governments. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
newly freed countries of Eastern Europe turned towards Western Europe and applied to
join western organizations like NATO and the EU. All of the candidates have serious
problems varying from economical, political, international, ethnic, religious, and social
conflicts.
Although the EU did not set an official timetable for the accessions, the position
of the Commission is that accession should take place as soon as a candidate is able to
assume the obligations of membership by meeting required economical and political
conditions.
8
Obligations for member countries are based on conformance with the tenants of
acquis communitaire, a term that represents the sum total of the EU's achievements in
harmonizing legislation, creation of a single market, and forging common policies.
Although it was up to new applicants to meet these criteria, the EU established one
condition for itself to meet. The Union should have the capacity to absorb new members,
while maintaining the momentum of European integration.
Other than the official EU enlargement policy, the leading EU members, like
France, Germany and UK have different priorities and perspectives on enlargement. For
example, France and Germany, as the key players, are striving to create policies that
favor their own national interests.




A French Lesson, The Economist, London, 29 June 2000.
In May 2000, German Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer initiated a debate on
Europe's future by stating that a federal Europe is still the goal of the Union. 10 The
Germans are keen for the EU to expand to the east, with Poland in the forefront. But the
French, fearing that that would give Germany even more clout in the EU, are dragging
their feet.
French President Jacques Chirac gave a speech to the German Parliament and
stated that Germany and France should form a close alliance with each other in order to
develop the core of the Union." In 1997, Chirac also stated that Poland would be in the
Union by the year 2000, and the Czech Republic and Hungary would follow. 1 " Now Mr.
Chirac and most of the other EU member states' leaders are predicting a date not earlier
than 2005 for the first accession. Mr. Chirac, in reply to a German proposal of a Federal
Europe, has proposed a two-tier arrangement, with the inner tier formed by a faster
moving Franco-German alliance. 13
Crucial decisions about the future of the EU and enlargement policies will be
determined in Nice, France in December 2000. The current French presidency of the
Council of European Union is keen to make progress on key issues such as security and
enlargement at the Nice Summit. 14 The French, like the British, remain far more reluctant
than the Germans to agree to a wide extension of majority voting in the EU's Council of
Ministers, where the 15 governments are represented.
Conversely, the United Kingdom's view on enlargement of the EU is smoother







Make it Ten, Set a Date, The Economist, London, 08 June 2000.
13
,
A French Lesson, The Economist, London, 29 June 2000.
14
,
Enlargement Pains, The Economist, London, 08 November 2000.
10
lies under its Euro-skeptic mood towards the EU. Britain's problem with the EU is its
supra-natural bodies and the democratic deficit caused by the uncontrolled power of the
European Commission. Enlargement may cause internal conflicts within the
Commission, because of the great increase on the number of commissioners from the
member countries and eventually reduce its power, and that is exactly what the British
want.
13
British did not want a strong Commission from the beginning. 16 In his recent
statements, British Prime Minister Tony Blair made it clear that the role of nation-state is
safeguarded and enhanced within the Union, and the federalist vision of the EU should be
downgraded. Mr. Blair's recent statements are influenced by Timothy Garton Ash, a
well-known historian and expert on Eastern European affairs, and usually emphasizes the
need to avoid new divisions between Eastern and Western Europe. 17 Mr. Ash urges that
the Union should give priority to the enlargement towards the Central and Eastern
Europe. In line with Mr. Ash's view on enlargement, Mr. Blair, by stating the need of
i o
setting a definite time for accessions, is calling for enlargement to begin in 2004.
The progress reports, which are prepared by the Commission to describe the
situations of candidate countries, show candidates where they fall short ofEU standards.
The Commission wants to imply that the candidates themselves see their shortcomings
with respect to the EU requirements, and justify the possible delay in the accession dates.




Young, H., This Blessed Plot, Britain in Europefrom Churchill to Blair, pp. 426-438, Woodstock and
New York, The Overlook Press, 1998.
17
,
Blair's Vision, The Economist, London, 30 September 2000.
18
,
It is time to agree to differ. The Economist, 05 October 2000.
11
accession.
1 And the fear in the event of any possible delays, the first date of entry might
be pushed beyond 2005. This could clearly result in a crisis of confidence among the
candidates.
B. COPENHAGEN CRITERIA AND AGENDA 2000 ENLARGEMENT PLAN
In its Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the European Council, in order to prepare
new candidates for accession, set down the following four main conditions that must be
met before being allowed to join.
• A functioning democracy with stable institutions.
• Adherence to rule of law, protection of individual rights, respect for human
rights and protection of minorities.
• Existence of a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with
competitive pressure within the Union.
• Having the ability to take on obligations of political, economical and
monetary union.
A fifth condition, which is particularly related to Turkey, is the settlement of all disputes
with other member states before any accession. The disputes between Turkey and Greece
and the Cyprus problem are important obstacles that Turkey must clear before gaining
EU membership. The EU expects Turkey to make constructive contributions to the
settlement of all disputes with neighboring countries by peaceful means. 20 Turkey's
relations with Greece could be big problems in the structural form of the Union. These
problems could prevent crucial policies from being implemented any time.
, Knocking on the Door, The Economist, 1 1 May 2000.
" EU Documents, Regular Report from the Commission on the Progress Towards Accession Turkey 1999,
p. 8. Available online: [http//europa.eu.intycorrrni./enlargement/dwn/report_10_99/en/word/turkey.doc].
Accessed on 22 August 2000.
12
To date, the EU has adopted more than 100,000 pages of regulations and
fundamental laws, which the candidates should accept and adopt as a whole to their legal
system prior to accession." Furthermore, the EU has already established certain criteria
and regulations for an enlargement program that candidates must meet. With the addition
of the thirteen candidates awaiting their membership approval, the number ofmembers
will be twenty-eight. Developed at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the EU's membership
requirements have been restated and made clearer in the enlargement plan, "Agenda
2000."
In July 1997, the Commission President Jacques Santer proposed Agenda 2000,
which set the Commission's strategy to reform and enlarge the Union and suggested that
accession negotiations begin with Central and Eastern European countries in 1998. The
main objective of the Agenda 2000 plan was to prepare both the EU and candidates for a
healthy unification. In the light of the Agenda 2000 package of reforms, the European
Commission agreed upon the following issues at the EU summit in Berlin during March
1999 in addition to the other internal issues.
22
• One of the greater tasks for the EU is to heal the divisions of Europe and
extend the same peace and prosperity to Central and Eastern European
countries that current EU countries have.
• The Agenda 2000 reform package will also initiate the necessary reforms,
including the reform ofCommon Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Regional
21 Van Oudenaren, John, "EU Enlargement, Return to Europe," in Ronald Tiersky, Europe Today, p. 407.
22 EU Documents, Europe's Agenda 2000, Strengthening and widening the European Union, p. 3.
Available online: [http:// www. Europe.eu.int/comm./agenda2000/public_en.pdf] Accessed on 22
November 2000.
13
Subsidies, to reshape the EU, so that it can ensure successful enlargement, and
at the same time deliver better economic prospects for Europe's citizens.
The challenges for the EU are to negotiate enlargement with 13 more candidates
that want to join, while at the same time prepare these for the moment of accession, and
finance these preparations." The Commission outlined a financial plan for years 2000-
2006. The Commission tried to ensure that there would be enough money in the EU's
budget to meet the costs of enlargement during this period, while also adopting the
conservative approach to spending which the member states have agreed upon.
Under the Agenda 2000 plan, the EU has also made special concessions to help
the agrarian sectors and rural economies of the candidate countries prepare for
membership. The European Council of Berlin recently decided to double pre-accession
aid from the year 2000, and to create two specific instruments, (1) the pre-accession
structural instrument (ISPA), with a budget of euro 1 ,040 million a year from the year
2000, and (2) the pre-accession agricultural instrument (SAPARD) with a budget of euro
520 million a year. This plan will be deployed in priority fields such as the improvement
of conversion structures, marketing channels and food quality control.
In Agenda 2000, the Commission proposed to focus on the program, which
prepares the candidate countries for EU membership by giving financial support for
institution building and investments, which are crucial for the countries to function well
within the EU. For Turkey the EU proposes the increase of financial aid from 2000 on.




24 EU Documents, Enlargement Strategy Paper, Reports on Progress towards Accession by Each of the
Candidate Country, p. 10, 10 November 2000. Available onlme:
[http://europa.eu.mt/comm./enlargement/report_l l_00/strat_en.pdf] Accessed on 15 November 2000.
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investment in the programs to bring Turkey in line with the EU regulations. 23 In addition
to this a proposal for a euro 450 million European Investment Bank loan has been made
available for Turkey by the European Commission to strengthen the Customs Union. 26
Agenda 2000 gives an evaluation of the economic and political situation of the
candidates including Turkey. According to this document, Turkey should make a firm
commitment to resolve a number of problems in the region, and contribute actively to a
just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. The plan also implies that the
European Union should continue to support Turkey's efforts to solve its economic and
political problems, which have prevented its accession into the Union.
In the closing remarks of the Berlin Summit in March 1999, heads of the member
states, referring to the Agenda 2000 plan, tried to assure the candidate countries that the
enlargement remains a historic priority for European Union for creating a stronger, wider,
more stable Europe. This would be a great achievement for 500 million citizens of what
would be a 28-member European Union. 28
C. THE POLICIES AND PROBLEMS WITHIN THE EU PREVENTING AN
EARLY ACCESSION OF TURKEY
1. The Economic Situation within the European Union
Although the overall economy of the EU seems to be doing well, certain countries
have special concerns and problems that prevents any early accession of a country like




"EU Documents, Regular Report from the Commission on the Progress Towards Accession Turkey 1998.
p, 6. Available online: [http://euxopa.eu.mtycomm./enlargement/dwn/report_ll_98/en/word/turkey_en.doc]
Accessed on 15 April 2000.
28EU Documents, Europe's Agenda 2000, Strengthening and Widening the European Union, p. 15.
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Tables 3A and 3B on pages 80 and 81), and with substantially lower wages for its labor
force.
Since the adoption of euro as a single currency in the EU, the euro has lost more
than 30 percent against the US dollar in international markets. The euro's weakness has
already pushed inflation above the European Central Bank's declared upper limit of 2
percent a year. Most of the inflationary pressure is resulting from surging oil prices. The
euro's weakness has added a huge surcharge for Europe since oil is priced in US dollars.
In Germany import prices have increased 1 3 percent in the last year and producer prices
have increased." The euro, which was regarded as a strong nval to the US dollar, has
instead became a currency that has needed serious, large scale intervention from the US
and European Central Bank. This situation has also revealed that Europe's economy is
not as strong or attractive as the economy in the US.
Particularly Germany is opposing the early accession of not only Turkey, but also
other candidates as well. Unification of East and West Germany brought a great amount
of financial burden and social problems on West Germany. Since 1990, following the
unification West Germany's net transfer of public money to East Germany, to pull the
East to the level of West, is about 540 billion USD, and according to some estimates
there is still a need of 300-400 billion to complete the unification process in 5-6 years. 30
The average unemployment rate in Germany is 10 percent, while it is more than 17
percent in East alone.
29
Andrews, E., "Out on a Limb, Another Lift Effort to Lift the Euro," The New York Times, p. B2, 04
November 2000.
,
Togetherness, a Balance Sheet, The Economist, 30 September 2000.
16
2. Institutional Reforms
With 13 countries waiting to join the EU, everybody within the Union is in favor
of reforming the institutions of the Union. But the problem is so big and tricky, that 15
current members are a long way from reaching an agreement. In a recent meeting in
Biarritz in France in October 2000, a huge debate took place when French President
Chirac demanded a new voting system, which gives large countries greater
representation. But the smaller countries responded with opposition that they were not
eager to sacrifice their voices on the European issues.
31
One of the major issues is remaking the European Commission, the main decision
making body, which is in charge of preparing policies and suggestions on the projects.
Currently, there are 20 members in the Commission, one from each small 10 countries
and 2 from each larger 5 countries. But with the enlargement, particularly with the
entrance of Turkey, with a projected population of more than 70 million at the time of
accession (year 2010-15), the number ofmembers in the Commission would be more
than 30 with the current structure. The problem with 30 bureaucrats would be the
improbability of reaching an agreement for the improvement of the EU with every
member pushing for his country's interests.
Another major problem is the number and type of decisions made through
qualified majority and unanimous voting. Many pivotal issues like sovereignty, common
taxation, foreign policy, defense and security issues, regional financial policies,
immigration policies still require unanimous vote. It is quite apparent that it would be
much harder to achieve unanimity with more and diversifying members, since even with
1 5 members reaching an agreement on fundamental changes is taking a long time and
, Make it Ten, Set a Date, The Economist, London, 8 June 2000.
17
severe discussions. But various countries are reluctant to give up their rights of veto on
the issues that is directly related to their self-interests. For example Britain is very
sensitive on the issues of common taxation and military affairs, Germany is concerned
about immigration policies and France is slowly showing some concerns on the
sovereignty issue. 32
3. Labor and Unemployment Inside the European Union and the
Immigration Problem
The leading countries of the EU, both Germany and France have serious
unemployment problems. The unemployment rate in France is 1 1 percent and in
Germany 10.5 percent. " Both countries have a substantial amount of foreign workers
within the labor force, and they are very sensitive to the immigration problem in Europe.
The North African immigrants in France and Turks in Germany form the bulk of
foreigners. However, any future membership of Turkey in the EU will grant unrestricted
travel of people as well. At this point, Germany's position is more critical than that of
other EU countries. The final outcome of a German policy on Turkey's entrance into the
Union could possibly be affected by the presence of 2.5 million Turkish people in
Germany.
The free movement of labor between Germany and Turkey is something most
Germans do not even want to consider, given their already difficult relationship with their
Turkish inhabitants/4 If Turkish people get the free movement and working rights within
the EU, obviously the biggest target country for Turks to immigrate to will be Germany.
J"
,
A French Lesson, The Economist, London, 29 June 2000.
CIA-The World Factbook 2000-France, and Germany. Available online:
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/fT.htrnl , and geos/gm.html.] Accessed on 25 November
2000.
4
Gordon, P.H., "Storms in the Med Blow towards Europe," The World Today, London, February 1998.
Available online: [http://proquest.umi.eom/pqdweb.htm .l. Accessed on 22 August 2000.
German reluctance to bring Turkey too close to the EU is also motivated by German
policy to preserve the EU as a potential political, economic and cultural federation,
something that would become even less likely for Turkey to join. 35 Currently the
governments of Germany and also Austria are very doubtful about the entry of new
candidates, let alone Turkey, but also the first group of Eastern European countries. 3<
4. The Common Agricultural Policy
One of the most difficult reforms within the EU's own structures seems to be in
the area of farm subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which costs
more than Euro 40 billion a year, almost equal to half of the EU budget, and regional
5*7
subsidies or structural funds, which absorb another third. In both policies, the
Commission had proposed plans, known as Agenda 2000. The Commission wants to cut
price guarantees for agricultural products to levels equal to the world average and shift
public subsidies towards direct payments to farmers.
Currently, mainly the French Farmers and then Italian and other Southern
European members' farmers benefit from the CAP. Prior to the CAP reform, no
candidates with large agricultural populations and predominantly agricultural economies,
(e.g., Poland and Turkey) would be able join the EU.
On the other hand, changes to structural funds could be more challenging to
implement, because they require unanimous approval, whereas CAP changes do not. The
Commission wants to reduce the percentage ofEU members' population eligible for
structural funds from 5 1 percent of the Union's population to 38 percent. The
35
Ibid.
, Knocking on the Door, The Economist, 1 1 May 2000.
J
,




Commission proposes that two-thirds of the money for regional subsidies should go to
poor regions, and the remainder to regions that have extremely high rates of
unemployment or industrial decline. In that case too, Turkey would acquire a substantial
amount of the funds with its high unemployment rate and backward industry.
Reforming structural funds appears to be necessary, but there will be definitely
losers within the Union. To soften the effects of the reform, the Commission is proposing
a transition period, which could last up to six years. 3
5. Priority of the Eastern European Countries
Turkey's top intellectuals regard the EU's decisions about Turkey as political and
prejudiced with respect to other candidate countries. Turkish leaders argue that the
qualifications of Turkey are much better than the Eastern European Countries. They
perceive the EU's policy towards Eastern European countries as a double standard of the
EU in dealing with membership issue of Turkey. Eastern European countries are invited
in and the EU discusses whatever problems they have, and these problems are addressed
jointly, with the EU's help.
40
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the European Union faced new problems. The
biggest was the emerging conflicts and instability in Eastern Europe. Eastern European
states, formerly satellites of the Soviet Union, began to replace their political and
economical systems with western type democracy and market economy. The Eastern
European states, emerging from the ruins of 45 years of domination of the Soviet rule,
r
ibid -
Bac, M. M., The never-ending story: Turkey and the European Union, para. 38,
Middle Eastern Studies: London; Oct 1998. Available online: [http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb.htm1.
Accessed on 22 August 2000.
20
were in desperate situation because of their collapsed economy and uncertain political
condition.
The people of Eastern Europe and Baltic States consider themselves as the natural
members of the bigger European family with their common cultural and traditional
aspects. " They are seeing the west as freedom, prosperity, and a better life. They are
thinking that they, too, deserve better lives, freedom, and prosperity after too much
suffering at the hands of imperialistic western and eastern powers. Indeed, at Essen,
Germany, in December 1994 the elected members of the EU member states called
enlargement to the East a, "moral obligation."
43
In fact, Vaclav Havel, the president of
Czech Republic revealed his feelings in a speech that he addressed to the General
Assembly of the Council on Europe on 9 October 1993, in Vienna, Austria, by stating
that:
Twice in this century all ofEurope has paid a tragic pricefor the narrow-
mindedness and lack of imagination of its democracies. These
democracies first failed when confronted with Nazism... They failed a
second time when they allowed Stalin to swallow up one half of our
continent... There is a saying: 'Everything good and evil comes in threes. '
Democratic Europe cannot afford a thirdfailure.
Again, on 15 May 1996, in Aachen, he once more expressed his views that:
// is true that united part of Europe would suffer if it expanded. On the
contrary, in the long run, it would suffer only if it failed to expand ...I
know neither the European Union nor the North Atlantic Alliance can
open its doors overnight to all those who aspire to join them. What both
most assuredly can do-and what they should do before it is too late-is to
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give the whole of Europe, seen as a sphere of common values, the clear
assurance that they are not closed clubs.
None of the EU members (especially Germany) want instability and conflicts in
Europe. Such conflicts can directly affect the security and prosperity of the EU states.
Moreover, the bulk of responsibility of the situation in Eastern Europe belongs to
Germany and other major Western Europe countries like France and England because of
their failure during World War I and World War II to stop the war, and after World War
II, Soviet hegemony and communist rule in Eastern Europe. So with the leading policies
of Germany, France and England the EU has placed its priorities on the Eastern European
states. In that sense, acceptance of Turkey as full-fledged member of the EU seems to be
on hold, at least until the first group of candidates' accessions.
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III. THE MAIN OBSTACLES PREVENTING TURKEYS FULL
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. TURKEY'S SHORTCOMINGS THAT EVOLYE DIRECTLY FROM ITS
DOMESTIC SITUATION
1. General Evolution
The majority of Turkish people and Turkish politicians think that Turkey has the
necessary qualifications to join EU, and also believe that Turkey is making every possible
effort to solve human rights problems, minority issues and democratization problems.
According to Turkish government officials, Turkey has had a functioning democratic
regime since 1923, and a market economy, that has the capacity to cope with EU
regulations and improving civil society.46 They also state that Turkish people have
freedom of speech and thought regardless of ethnicity, and that Turkey respects human
rights and protects minorities within the framework of Turkish legal structure. Indeed,
according to Edwin McBride, as he stated in his Survey on Turkey, "most Turks attribute
their long wait for membership to harsh European racism, not to any failings of their
own.
Turkish political leaders and top officials have always regarded the warnings and
decisions of EU as unacceptable interventions in Turkey's domestic affairs. According to
these officials, human rights, the Kurdish issue, political freedom and democratization
problems are Turkey's domestic concerns and do not necessarily indicate the need for
third-party intervention. However, in the EU part, such an organization, which is
identified with its liberal democratic norms and rule of law, sees the intervention right in
46
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itself to the domestic issues of the members that are not in line with the ElTs regulations,
as in the case of Austria. The Union refused the government partners, who were regarded
as extreme rightist parties in Austria, and imposed diplomatic sanctions on the country.
The Turkish government also rejected the claims of the EU on the trial process of
Mr. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), which has been conducting terrorist actions in Turkey since 1984.
The government declared that the EU claims were intervention to Turkish domestic
affairs and disrespectful to independent Turkish Judicial system.^ In an interview with
Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in April 1999, Ecevit stated that the EU's
preconditions for Turkey-an improvement of its human rights record, help in settling the
Cyprus problem, and a deal with the Kurds- were just excuses for excluding Turkey. The




The democratization process in Turkey is being monitored by the EU. In its
explanatory memorandum on 8 October 2000, in Brussels, Belgium the European
Commission proposed the following requirements to be met by Turkey in the medium
term.
52
• Turkey should guarantee full enjoyment by all individuals without any
discrimination and irrespective of their language, race, color, sex,
political opinion, philosophical belief or religion of all human rights
49
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and fundamental freedoms, and ensure cultural diversity and guarantee
cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin.
Turkey should make necessary changes in its constitution to guarantee
rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens as set forth in the European
Convention for Protection ofHuman Rights, and remove any legal
provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother
tongue in TV/radio broadcasting.
Turkey should abolish the death penalty, sign and ratify Protocol N° 6
of the European Convention ofHuman Rights.
Turkey should also align the constitutional role of the National
Security Council as an advisory body to the government in accordance
with the practice ofEU member states.
In its 1998 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession, the
Commission also concluded that:
On the political side, the evaluation highlights certain anomalies in the
functioning of the public authorities, persistent human rights violations
and major shortcomings in the treatment ofminorities. The lack ofcivilian
control ofthe army gives causefor concern. This is reflected by the major
role played by the army in political life through the National Security
Council.
As reflected in the Commission's 1998 report, Turkey has some serious problems
with its democratization process with regard to the EU standards. In many documents and
statements the major concerns generally focus on the following areas: restrictions on
freedom of speech, problems related to the Constitution and political parties, human
rights abuses, restrictions on the political and cultural rights of Kurdish origin citizens
and related to this the PKK terror organization and the Kurdish dilemma, rise of political
Islam and related to this the restrictions on religious affairs, high level influence of the
Turkish Military in political and state affairs, and weak and unresponsive civil society.
Given the circumstances, according to Turkish political and military leaders, Turkey is
left to choose between adopting necessary regulations to grant a more democratic and
>3 EU Documents, Regular Report from the Commission on the Progress Towards Accession Turkey 1998,
p. 22.
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free Turkey that meets the EU criteria for a democratized state or experiencing an ethnic
and political conflict, including the possible disintegration of the unitary state by
separatist actions and the instability caused by radical Islamic movements.
a. Restrictions on Freedom ofSpeech
Limits on freedom of speech and the press pose a serious problem in
Turkey for the democratization process. According to the Turkish Constitution, there
should be freedom of speech and freedom of the press in the country. However, the
Turkish government is reportedly continuing to limit these freedoms. 5 The Turkish
Constitution reserves the right to such restrictions on these freedoms on the basis of
national security-related considerations. Police and the courts have continued to limit
freedom of expression by citing laws in the 1982 Constitution as well as other laws,
including the 1991 Anti-Terror Law, which strictly forbids separatist propaganda, Article
159 of the Criminal Code, that refers to laws prohibiting criticism of the Parliament, the
army, Republic, or judiciary, Article 160 which prohibits condemnation of the Turkish
Republic, Article 169 prohibits aiding an illegal organization, Article 312 in reference to
the incitement to racial, ethnic or religious enmity, the Law to Protect Ataturk," and
Article 16 of the Press Law. 57
In 1999, Turkish Parliament passed two new laws, on combating criminal
organizations and on prosecuting civil servants. These new laws contain provisions
allowing prosecutions for certain types of speech. Parliament in August 1999, also passed
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a law suspending for 3 years the sentences of writers and journalists convicted of crimes
involving freedom of expression through the media. By the end of the year, at least 25
journalists, authors, or political party officials who had published articles were released,
CO
and hundreds more had their trials halted." 1 However, they could be sent back to jail if
they commit a similar crime within a 3-year period. The Committee to Protect Journalists
(CPJ) reported that at least 18 journalists remained imprisoned by the end of 1999,
compared with 25 in 1998. 59
The Turkish Constitution does not allow political parties based on class,
religion, ethnicity or separatism. During the 1990's, the Constitutional Court demanded
the closure of three pro-Kurdish parties and one pro-Islamist political party. Another pro-
Islamist party, the Virtue Party (the successor of the previously banned pro-Islamist
Welfare Party) is currently under investigation by the Constitutional Court.60 The
government, in an attempt to reform the Political Parties' Act. adopted yet another new
law in August 1999, which made the closure of political parties more difficult. 61
Some members of the country's political elite, bureaucracy, military, and
judiciary claim that the state is threatened by both fundamental Islamist action and
separatist Kurdish movement. Such groups continue to call for concrete steps to be taken
that would entail limits on, freedom of expression, in order to address these threats. As a
result of these measures, the leader of Welfare Party Necmettin Erbakan, and former
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were banned from politics because of their statements which were regarded as promoting
religious enmity and threatening the unity of the state. Tayyip Erdogan, who had quoted a
poem of Ziya Gokalp, a famous ideologue of Turkish nationalism at the disintegration
period of the Ottoman Empire, was released after serving more than 4 months of a 10-
month sentence for this conviction. 6"
The media's situation in Turkey is somewhat better in terms of free press
regulations and reaching the mass population. During the last decade, the electronic
media in Turkey has developed considerably, and now reaches almost every corner of
Turkey, and their influence, particularly that of television, is high. 63 According to the
Government's Directorate General of Press and Information, in addition to the state-
owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, there are 230 local, 15 regional, and
20 national private television stations. Additionally, there are 1,044 local, 108 regional,
and 36 national radio stations in Turkey. 64
The increasing availability of satellite dishes and cable television makes it
possible to access foreign broadcasts, including several Turkish-language private
channels. Internet use is growing, and faces no government restrictions; in fact, some
banned newspapers and the web sites of PKK and several of its branches can be accessed
freely on the Internet and government censorship of foreign periodicals is very rare. 65
The law, which regulates broadcasting in Turkey, makes it illegal for
broadcasters to threaten the country's unity or national security, and limits the private
broadcast of television programs in languages other than Turkish. The High Board of
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Radio and Television (RTUK), created in 1994 to regulate private television and radio
frequencies, monitors broadcasters, and occasionally shuts them down if they are not in
compliance with relevant laws. Nevertheless, despite the Government's restrictions, the
media criticizes government leaders and policies daily. Lively debates on human rights
and government policies were stimulated by several events, including President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer's (then Constitutional Court President) call in March 1999 to lift restrictions
on freedom of expression, including restrictions on language rights. 66
To reach a more functional democracy and freedom of speech, Turkey
should revise the criminal laws that talk about crimes against state to ensure the freedom
of speech and freedom of press. Given the democratic requirements and to ensure
freedom of speech, the difference between legitimate political speech or criticism of
government and threats to the unity of the state should be clearly examined and
recognized. As Gunduz Aktan, former Ambassador to Greece and Japan, explains,
Turkey needs to separate violence and threats to the unity and stability of the state from
legitimate free speech for real democracy. 67
b. Problems Related to the Constitution and Political Parties
After Turgut Ozal, who died in 1993, none of the Turkish political parties
managed to build a powerful and stable government. Turkey mostly suffered from a
series of weak, short-lived and corrupt governments. Although the primary culprit for this
goes to the electoral system, political parties have also failed to provide an uncorrupt
political environment and promising valuable policies to their voters.
66
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Eventhough the electoral system foresees a bar of 10 percent votes for
parties nationwide, the distribution of the votes, and consequently the seats in the
parliament did not permit any single party to form the government until now (see election
results in Table 7 on page 85). Even two party coalitions were a distant target in the
political structure of Turkey.
In some cases, ideologically very diverse parties formed coalition
governments in order to save their leading cadre from prosecution for corruption. The
coalition government formed by True Path party and then the Welfare party is an ironic
example of such a coalition government in Turkey. The leader of the True Path Party,
Tansu Ciller, had declared before 1995 elections that if her party would not succeed, then
the pro-Islamist Welfare Party would capture the government, and she titled Welfare
Party as the enemy of the state. Moreover, Ciller declared that she would never form a
coalition with Welfare's leader Necmettin Erbakan. 68 However, the outcome was the
reverse. To protect her head from corruption scandals and investigations about spending
state money in an unauthorized way, Tansu Ciller formed a coalition government with
Erbakan.
The lack of internal democracy within the political parties is another major
concern. Almost all of the political parties in Turkey are under direct control of their
leaders. They have an absolute power on decision-making process and in nominating the
candidates for Parliament from their parties. As stated in a survey about Turkey in The
Economist in June 2000, "The leaders are the emperors of their parties. They can
Bac, M. M., The never-ending story: Turkey and the European Union, para. 32.
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summarily dismiss members, have absolute control over the all important party lists at
elections, and never seem to retire."69
However, some new faces are emerging in the political arena of Turkey.
The President Ahmet Necdet Sezer is one of them. He succeeded 76 years old Suleyman
Demirel in May 2000 as a 59 years old President. The opinion polls say that, for the first
time in Turkey's 77 years as a republic, the president now wins more trust than the
Military, which has always topped the poll. 70 Mr. Sezer called on parliament to enact
wide-ranging constitutional and democratic reforms and to uphold the supremacy of law.
He stated, "Such changes should be carried out not because the EU wants them but
because these are changes that our people deserve."71
The other new leader in Turkish politics is Devlet Bahceli, the head of the
National Action Party, which is also a partner in current government. Mr. Bahceli is
trying to shift his party towards the center and make it more acceptable to the middle
class Turks.
72 He eagerly agreed on many crucial issues including the suspension of
Ocalan's death sentence until the decision of European Court of Justice. He even reversed
the old conservative attitude of party on ban of Islamic headscarves in government
schools and state offices by stating that the ban should be kept in its place. The flexibility
of Mr. Bahceli in such major issues resulted in that the oddly formed government, center
left and far right, has been much more successful than expected. Today, Mr. Bahceli and
his party became more respectable in most public eyes.
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Even in the pro-Islamist Virtue Party some changes are taking place. After
Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul are gaining great popularity within
the party with respect to the 70 years old Recai Kutan, current leader of the Virtue
Party.
73
Several factors helped Mr. Gul and Mr. Erdogan in gaining popularity. Although
they too want religion to play a bigger part in Turkish life, and argue in favor of letting
women wear Islamic-style headscarves in state schools and government offices, they
sounded more democratic with respect to Erbakan and current party leaders and they also
back Turkey's application to join the EU.
c. Human Rights Abuses
The Turkish Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security forces
continue to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons in custody and during
interrogations.
75
Despite the Government's cooperation with unscheduled foreign
inspection teams, public pledges by successive governments to end the practice, and new
government initiatives designed to address the problem, torture continues to be
widespread.
76 Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture say that
most persons detained on suspicion of having committed political crimes usually suffer
some torture at the hands of police and gendarme during periods of interrogation before
they are brought before a court. Ordinary criminal suspects also report frequent torture
and mistreatment by police.
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Government officials admit that torture occurs, but deny that it is
systematic.
78
However, many of the human rights abuses are related to the state's
campaign with the PKK. Indeed, much of the reported abuses occur in the southeastern
part of the country.
The current government adopted a series of initiatives during the last year
designed to improve human rights conditions. They included: removing military judges
from the State Security Courts; increasing maximum, although not minimum, sentences
for torture or for falsifying a medical record to hide torture; calling for prosecutors to
make unscheduled inspections of detention sites; making it more difficult to close
political parties; suspending for 3 years the sentences or court cases of dozens of
journalists and writers, provided they do not commit a similar offense; imposing a time
limit on supervisors to decide whether civil servants, including security forces, can be
prosecuted; and allowing prosecutors to begin immediately collecting evidence of alleged
abuse by security officials.
Moreover, several advocates reported a reduction in the number of torture
victims in the southeast during the year. They attribute the decrease to fewer detentions;
reduced PKK violence, which has eased treatment by security officials; better-educated
security officers; and increased concern about the problem from many sources.
The question of death penalty has recently been a major subject of debate
in Turkey, as well as in the EU, in connection with the Ocalan trial. Although Turkey has
not carried out any executions since 1984, the EU wants Turkey to abolish the death






d. PKK Terror Organization and the Kurdish Dilemma
Another aspect of the rise of radicalism in Turkey is related to the Kurdish
separatist movement. The government's capabilities in handling the Kurdish issue
constitute a testing ground for judging its commitment to democratization, since human
rights violations occurred in mostly Kurdish populated areas. In Turkey, there is an
estimated population of about 12-15 million people of Kurdish origin constituting about
one-sixth of Turkey's population.
80
Problems basically revolve around the recognition of
the separate cultural identity of the Kurdish population and the use of the Kurdish
language. The Kurdish separatist action surfaced itself by the establishment of the PKK,
led by Abdullah Ocalan, which began its separatist activities in Southeast Turkey in
1984. The Turkish government views the problem as a domestic conflict. Similarly, the
Turkish military's position is that the PKK is a separatist terrorist organization that has to
be smashed militarily.
For over 1 5 years, the Government has engaged in an armed conflict with
the terrorist PKK, whose original goal was the formation of a separate Kurdish state in
southeastern Turkey. Since 1984, the PKK has waged a violent terrorist insurgency in
southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces and civilians (mainly Kurds whom
the PKK accused of cooperating with the state). 81 The police, the Gendarme, village
guards, and the armed forces in turn have waged an intense campaign to suppress PKK
terrorism, targeting active PKK units as well as persons whom they believe support or
sympathize with the PKK. In the process, both government forces and PKK terrorists
committed human rights abuses against each other and against civilians. According to the
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documents of Governorship to the State of Emergency Legislation in South East Turkey,
since 1987, 23,342 PKK members, 5,021 security force members, 307 government
employed civilians, and 4,447 civilians lost their lives in the fighting (see Table 8 on
page 86).
82
A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues in five southeastern
provinces that have experienced substantial PKK terrorist violence. Under the state of
emergency, the regional governor may exercise certain quasi-martial law powers,
including imposing restrictions on the press, removing from the area persons whose
activities are deemed detrimental to public order, and ordering village evacuations. In an
effort to deny the PKK logistical support, the government displaced more than 500 000
people from villages in the southeast since 1984. The Turkish government has reported
that by 1999, the total number of those evacuated was 362,915 persons, from 3,236
villages and hamlets, of whom 26,481 have been resettled with government assistance in
176 villages and hamlets. Another 61,987 have applied to return. 83 The financial burden
of the campaign to Turkey has been about 8 billion annually.
Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework for the
Protection of National Minorities, and the Turkish Constitution does not recognize the
Kurds as a national, racial, or ethnic minority. Eventhough this group constitutes the
country's largest ethnic and linguistic group in Turkey, the Kurds were denied the right to
use the Kurdish language in election campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some
cultural activities, such as weddings. However, the argument that the Kurds are denied
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their language, cultural identity and democratic rights in any form is not exactly true.
There are no legal barriers to Kurds' participation in political and economic affairs, and
many members of Parliament, senior officials and professionals are Kurds. However,
Kurds who publicly or politically assert their Kurdish identity or publicly espouse the use
of Kurdish language in a public domain risk public censure, harassment, or prosecution.
Printed material in Kurdish is legal. However, the police continue to
interfere with the distribution of some newspapers, and the governor of the emergency
region banned some Kurdish-language newspapers in that mainly Kurdish-speaking area.
Kurdish music recordings are widely available, but bans on certain songs and singers
persist. Radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish are illegal, and in practice rarely
occur. Some radio stations, especially in the southeast, play Kurdish music. The
Government's broadcast monitoring agency mostly tolerates this practice but has closed
down some stations for playing politically oriented, banned Kurdish music.
However, the government might abolish the bans on broadcasting in
Kurdish in the near future. The issue is in public debate through 1990s. A recent
declaration of Senkal Atasagun. the head of Turkey's intelligence agency, proposed that
Turkey should not execute Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan and the ban on
domestic Kurdish-language broadcast should be lifted is a sign of changing policy on the
issue. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has also supported Atasagun' s statement.
In February 1999, the Government captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.
In June he was tried in a State Security Court on the charge of treason by trying to
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separate part of the country from government control and was sentenced to death. After
his capture and trial, Ocalan called for PKK members to leave Turkey and commit
themselves to a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem. In August 1999, Parliament
passed legislation allowing members of terrorist organizations and criminal gangs to
apply over a 6-month period for amnesty or reductions in sentences, as long as they
provide useful information that helps lead to the dissolution of the organization.
Almost half of the Kurdish originated citizens of Turkey live in the
western part of Turkey, particularly in the big cities such as Istanbul, and Ankara and
other industrial cities. Millions of these Kurds are somewhat integrated to the other
population and seem to be prosperous and happy. There are many successful
businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, soldiers and even former President Turgut Ozal
identified himself somewhat related to Kurds. Individuals who were openly identifying
themselves at least partly Kurdish, have served as the Mayor of Istanbul, Prime Minister,
even Chief of Military Staff.
The other point worth addressing with the Kurds in the western part of
Turkey is that they provide little or no support for pro-Kurdish political parties. For
example, the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), the largest Kurdish political party
received only 4.7 percent of the total votes in the last 1999 parliamentary elections (see
Table 7 on page 85). If we consider the 12-15 million Kurdish population, almost 15
percent of total population, the support is really weak for HADEP. However, in
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southeastern part of Turkey, where the percentage of the Kurds is higher, HADEP got 40-
60 percent of the votes locally.
While the EU is criticizing Turkey for its bad treatment of citizens of
Kurdish origin, the Union is also fully upholding the territorial integrity of Turkey. The
EU reiterates its condemnation of all forms of terrorism, but at the same time, expects
Turkey to resolve its problems by political means with full respect for human rights, the
rule of law in a democratic society and in full accordance with Turkey's commitments as
a member of the Council of Europe.
e. Freedom ofReligion and Fundamentalist Islamist Movement
As a pre-dominantly Muslim country, 99 percent of the population in
Turkey is Muslim, primarily Sunni.92 In addition to the country's Sunni majority, an
estimated 12 million Alawis (an offshoot of Shi'a Islam) freely practice their faith and
build "Cem Houses" (Alawi places of worship). 93 The state supervises the religious
education in public and private schools, pays the salaries of imams (government
appointed official prayers in mosques) and other official religious clerics, and appoints
suitable candidates for the mosques and other religious public assignments. The state also
generates state funds for the mosque building as in the case of Kocatepe Mosque. 94
However, in accordance with a law amended in 1997, 8 years of secular education
became compulsory, and new enrollments in the first 8 years of the Islamic Imam-Hatip
schools (in existence since 1950) were stopped, although children already in those classes
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were allowed to finish their grades. The Imam-Hatip schools were very popular among
conservative and Islamist Turks as an alternative to secular public education. The parents
were able to enroll their children after primary school at the age of 1 1 (which is regarded
by the Islamist groups as a very suitable age to train in religious affairs). Now, under
current law, students may pursue study at Imam-Hatip "high schools' 1 upon completion of
8 years of compulsory education in the secular public schools. Students who complete
primary school may study the Koran in government-sponsored schools. The Government
does not permit private Koran classes.
The Constitution establishes Turkey as a secular state, and provides for
freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the private dissemination of religious ideas.
The government generally honors these tenants in practice; however, it has imposed some
restrictions on religious minorities and on religious expression in government offices and
state-run institutions, including universities.
95
Several human rights monitors and
members of the pro-Islamist Virtue Party have complained that the government has
stepped up enforcement of a 50-year-old ban on the wearing of religious head garments
in government offices and other state-run facilities, by stating that wearing head scarves
in public buildings is against the law. Hundreds ofwomen who wear head coverings have
lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and teachers. During 1999, 312 teachers,
including 180 student teachers, lost their jobs for wearing head coverings. 6 This attitude
of government imposing restrictions on religious affairs is a EU concern regarding
Turkey's democratization process.
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The case of Merve Kavakci, a newly elected Member of Parliament from
the Virtue Party who sought unsuccessfully to be sworn in to Parliament on May 2, 1999,
wearing an Islamist-style headscarf, highlighted the continuing dispute over the ban on
religious-style clothing in official settings. Pnme Minister Bulent Ecevit, President
Demirel, and the National Security Council criticized her actions as a challenge to the
secular state. The mainstream press was also critical, but the Islamist-oriented media
defended her actions. The personal controversy over Kavakci's right to wear a headscarf
in Parliament became largely moot after Kavakci was stripped of Turkish citizenship for
failing to notify authorities that she had acquired a foreign nationality. 97 Another aspect
of the Kavakci incident was that many scholars and politician stated that the Merve
Kavakci incident was planned by Erbakan, and accused Erbakan by stating that he was
the man pulling the strings behind Merve Kavakci. 98
/ The Role ofthe Turkish Military in Political Issues and State
Affairs
One of the biggest concerns the EU cites about Turkey is the military's
powerful influence on political affairs. The role of Turkish military in political affairs
shows that the Turkish military is not operating according to the tenants of democracy as
defined by the EU. The role of the Turkish military in politics of Turkey is an important
obstacle to the process of democratization in Turkey. The Turkish military acts as the
'guardian' of the reforms of Ataturk and Turkey. 99 Therefore any threat to these two
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meets with severe reaction and criticism from the military. It is in this context that
military opposes the rise of political Islam and the separatist actions of PKK as well,
since the military leaders perceive that the political Islam threatens the secular basis of
state and the Kurdish action threatens the integrity of the country.
The active role of the military in politics gets its roots from historical
events. Most reform and modernization movements in the late Ottoman period and during
the early years of the Turkish Republic came by the hands of military. During the last
decade of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish military assumed an even greater role in
Turkish politics with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. 100 Despite the ideas of Mustafa




In fact, Mustafa Kemal was a successful soldier, and he and some of his
close friends from the Turkish Military formed the Republican Peoples' Party, which was
the single political party of Turkey until 1946. 102 Mustafa Kemal, however, insisted that
they all make a clear choice between military and political affairs. Ataturk's main
reforms aimed at the westernization of Turkey as a whole. Secularism became the corner
stone of the Republic. But after the introducing of multi-party system in 1946, the
political parties and politicians usually failed to form adequate civil consensus among
themselves to create solutions to serious problems. First in 1960, later 1972, and 1980
military became more active to create political decisions to preserve the republic and its
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founding principles, and intervened to 'clean up the mess," which politicians made, as
Meltem Muftuler Bac describes it. 103
The role of the Turkish military in political affairs was based in part on
Turkeys need for skilled, educated, modern politicians (who then mainly come from
military ranks) since only the military had qualified candidates. Since the introduction
of the multi party system in 1946, the Turkish military intervened on three occasions and
took control of the government in a military coup. In each case, the military commanders
justified intervention based on the existence of an internal conflict, which threatened the
security and the stability of the state, and the lack of political consensus within the
parliament to solve the immediate crisis. 105
The last military intervention in 1980 also came as a result of intense
domestic conflict. The responses of the outside world to that intervention were generally
positive, except for some moderate concerns in Europe. 106 In the US, the first reaction to
the intervention was positive. The US National Security Council advisor and head of the
Turkish desk Paul Henze stated that the intervention was necessary to save Turkey, the
weak link ofNATO, from chaos in time. 107 He also stated that the intervention was in the
United States' interests. The intervention was accepted by the Western world as a
necessary measure to preserve stability in an important geo-political region.
The current problem is no longer the danger of a possible military coup,
but the omnipresent role of the military in civilian politics. Turkish Chief of Staffs
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declaration before the 1995 General elections that "the Turkish Armed Forces are the
most effective guarantor of the Turkish Republic which is a secular, social and lawful
state." succinctly clarifies the military's position in Turkey.
1 9
The EU opposes this omnipotent military presence in politics and cites it
as concrete proof that Turkish democracy is far behind the European standard. 110
However, most Turks rate the Military Forces as the countries most popular institution by
stating that it is about the only thing in the country that works. '
'
In its last two country reports on Turkey, the European Commission
pointed out that the lack of civilian control of the Turkish Military is a major concern
about the democratic system of Turkey. The report stated two main points as disturbing
anomalies amended in the constitution. The first is the National Security Council (NSC),
half of whose members are military commanders, including the Chief of Military Staff.
The second, the Chief of Military Staff reports directly to the Prime Minister (not to the
defense minister, as in the western countries). In Turkey, the power of the military
through the NSC indicates that the military is in a position of highest command. For
example, on 28 February 1997, during an NSC meeting, the military members were
adamant about reforming the education system, and asked the government to implement
educational reforms. The NSC announced on March 1, 1997, that it expected the
government to take measures to strengthen secularism, and that failure to do so might
result in military intervention. The inability of the government in power (the coalition
109
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between the True Path Party and Welfare Party) to pass educational reform became one
of the factors that led to its downfall in June 1997.
112
The solution to both issues will require a stable political environment in
which the government can effectively deal with the country's problems, and skilled,
professional politicians hold offices. Until now, military's position has been that the
nation and its survival in the Kemalist sense, which means democratic, secular, modern
and unitary, is of indisputable importance, and can not be left to the politicians who have
frequently proved their incompetence in fulfilling their national duties. 113 The promising
point is that the Turkish military wants to participate in the EU's newly emerging
"security and defense identity," so the military will have to adjust itself to the EU norms
along with the other institutions of the state.
3. Turkish Economy
In Copenhagen, Denmark, in June 1993, the European Council stated that
membership in the Union requires the existence of a functioning market economy, and
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
With the introduction of a market economy by Turgut Ozal, former Prime Minister and
President of Turkey, the structure of Turkish economy transformed into a competitive,
dynamic body." 5 As set out in Agenda 2000, the existence of a functioning market
economy requires that prices, as well as trade, be liberalized and that an enforceable legal
system, including property rights, be in place. 116 The EU wants Turkey to commit itself
to the implementation of the deflation and structural reform program agreed with the IMF
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and the World Bank, and in particular, ensure control of public spending. The Union also
points out the necessity of implementing the financial sector reform, aiming at
guaranteeing transparency and surveillance."
After years of frequently changing governments, the parliamentary election in
April 1999 resulted in the formation of a coalition government with a comfortable
parliamentary majority in Turkey. Under Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, this coalition
government seems to be strongly committed to tackle overdue structural reforms and to
bring down the chronic high levels of inflation and public deficits paralyzing the Turkish
economy during most of the 1990's (see Table 3B on page 81). 118 By early July 1999, the
new government had already reached a further agreement with the IMF on a staff
monitored program, and a consolidation program starting in the year 2000, with the goal
of lowering inflation to single digit numbers by 2002.
'
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During 2000, after a period of economic slowdown in growth rates (due in part to
the Russian crisis and the earthquake in August 1999), the Turkish economy is recovering
from the sharp recession of 1999 (See Table 3A on page 80). Economic growth has
resumed in 2000, mainly because of increasing domestic demand for industrial products,
particularly in the automotive sector. The decline in interest rates has also contributed to
the increasing demand. 1 "
After decades of attempts to use its own enterprises to modernize and diversify
the Turkish economy, the state still plays an important role as an economic agent,
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especially in sectors like basic industries and banking. The legal framework for the
working of a market economy is largely in place. The new government has also brought
through parliament a change to the constitution, in order to allow for international
arbitration. This measure facilitates privatization of enterprises in the energy,
telecommunications and infrastructure sector and removes a considerable incentive for
foreign direct investment, which until now is still very low in view of the economy's size
and potential.
Small family companies are forming the main dynamic body of the Turkish
private sector. In the manufacturing sector they account a great part of the total number of
enterprises, employ about 61.1 percent of total employment and generate 27.3 percent of
value added.
121
These companies demonstrated a high degree of flexibility and
adaptability to new situations, but their competitiveness in a bigger market is limited as
their access to the Turkish capital market is restricted and their management and
l yy
administrative skills are not up to modern standards.
The current unemployment rate in Turkey is about 7.3 percent; it was 6.3 percent
in 1998, as compared to 6.4 percent in 1997, (and an underemployment rate of 7 percent
should to be added to unemployment rates) according to official figures (see Table 4 on
page 82).
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It should be noted that no unemployment insurance system exists in Turkey
at the present, although with the adoption of the Social Security Bill in 1999, an
unemployment insurance scheme is to be introduced during year 2000. 124
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The high birth rate, 18.7 per 1000, and low productivity in Turkey contribute to a
low GDP per capita of Dollars 5,015 (see Tables 2 and 3A on pages 79 and 80).
Purchasing power is at one-fourth of the Union average. Turkey's population of 65
million, with the exception of Poland, is almost equal to the total population of all the
candidates (see Tables 1 and 2 on pages 78 and 79). Should Turkey become a member in
the EU, the huge amount of unemployed and under employed people in Turkey would fill
the workstations of Europe. Germany, particularly, has great reservations about this issue,
since nearly 2,5 million Turkish people live there.
According to 1999 EU Regular Report on candidates' progress towards accession,
Turkey has made considerable progress in dealing with the most urgent imbalances in the
economy, in achieving macroeconomic stability, especially in reducing inflationary
pressures and public deficits. 125 However, the process of achieving a smoothly
functioning market economy is not completed, as there are still considerable areas of state
dominance and market distortions— especially in agriculture and the financial sector. 1 "
The Turkish economy has not yet reached a sufficient degree of stability to allow for
medium-term planning of economic agents. Recent financial crisis, which pushed up the
interest rates to over 100 percents in one day in banking sector, is the result of imbalances
in the economy. 1
"'
In order to support and safeguard macroeconomic stabilization, the government
launched a reform program that creates some important structural reforms to be
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1 7R
balanced harmony particularly in dealing with economical issues. ~ L The reform program
involves all key areas including public finances, public administration, the privatization
of state owned enterprises, the banking and the agricultural sector and the social security
129
system.
With respect to the EU standards, the huge but less productive agricultural sector
also needs to be reformed immediately with the privatization of state owned entities. The
agricultural sector in Turkey forms 40 percent of total labor capacity, but contributes only
14 percent ofGDP (see Tables 3A and 4 on pages 80 and 82). The government's new
approach has been to reduce support prices in line with the inflation target, and to end
subsidized credits to the agricultural sector. With respect to financial sector reform, the
legislative framework has been set and the Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Board has
been established, but the privatization of four state-controlled banks, forming the 40
percent of total assets are not completed yet.
With the EU's current regulations in CAP and regional subsidies, Turkey would
become a large burden, a burden that would be more than the EU could absorb easily. 1
So far, the Union is already trying to reform CAP and regional subsidies. By decreasing
the share ofCAP and regional subsidies in the Union's total budget, the EU is trying to
make it easier for the Union to absorb the new members.
As a non-member state with a Customs Union Agreement with the EU, Turkey's
trade integration with the Union is considerably high. The major economic effect of the
Customs Union has been a redirection of Turkey's imports from third-countries towards
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the EU. The trade volume between Turkey and the EU is continuously increasing (see
Table 5 on page 83). Current amount of exports and imports to and from the EU forms
nearly 50 percent of Turkey's total trade amount, with the share of manufactured
commodities rising from 66 percent in 1990 to nearly 70 percent in 1999. 1 !
4. Turkish Cultural and Religious Life
One factor bound up with Turkey's problems with democracy, making
incorporation in the EU difficult, is the perceived cultural differences between Turkey
and the rest of Europe. There are two opposing tendencies at work in the construction of
Turkish identity. One is based on the modem, secular, Westem-oriented; the other is
traditional, Islamic and Oriental in its origins. Especially, the Pro-Islamist wing
1 7-)
politicians claim that the EU is a "Christian Club"' based on religious orientation. " They
also state that the differences between two religions make it impossible to form any kind
of union with the EU.
Modern Turkish history is one of continuous struggle between these two
tendencies. Modernization in Turkey is perceived to be a process of westernization. One
primary goal of modernization is the recognition of Turkey as part of Europe. There is a
strong desire among the Turkish intelligentsia, its bureaucracy and its military to gain
acceptance as a European state. Thus, when the new Turkish Republic was established in
1923, its political leaders aimed to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary
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determined to carry out a cultural revolution, by persuasion if possible, by force where
134
necessary.
Turkey's population growth rate is definitely lower than that of the other Muslim
countries, but in fact it is the highest among all EU countries and candidates (see Table 2
on page 79). With the current economic and social structure this population growth rate
will result in more problems in the country, since GDP per capita is already quite low, on
the other hand, unemployment rate is very high. The average age of the total population
is relatively younger than the EU average. By some indicators, the sociological and
cultural gap between Turkey and EU is tending to narrow by the modernization process
of Turkey. The proportion of urban population has risen from 42 percent to 64 percent in
ten years.
1 5 As people come to the big cities the birth rate has fallen sharply, the average
of marriage age has gone up, and female participation in the labor force has risen. 13
On the other hand, as the social problems have increased as a result of the
immigration, the Islamic religion has reemerged as a dynamic element in the culture to
manage the unbalanced welfare distribution. The religion has developed a strong
presence in the society, with religious foundations providing support in education,
housing and health for those who are let down by the poor social services of the state.
Is Turkey really European? It is almost impossible to categorize Turkey among a
group of states; it is neither a part of Christian Europe nor a part of the Muslim, Arab,




Clark, B., The Keystone of Europe, European Business Journal; London; 1999. Available online:
[http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb.htm]. Accessed on 17 July 2000.
136
Ibid.
137 Waxman, D., Conflict Studies 311, Turkey's Identity Crisis: Domestic Discord and Foreign Policy, p.
1 1, Riset (Research Institutefor the Study of Conflict and Terrorism), August 1998.
50
acceptance of Turkey's incorporation to the European ranks with the 1856 Paris
Conference, and Turkey was brought into the Concert of Europe. Yet throughout history,
the Turks have been perceived by most of the Europeans as the "other" of Europe.
The EU has an important place in defining what is Europe and who is European.
A new European Identity is being described into which Turkey's inclusion seems to be
harder. As Samuel Huntington stated in his famous book "Clash of Civilizations,"
European civilization stops at the western borders of Turkey. This border is the place
where Christian Civilization separates from Islamic Civilization, states Huntington. 1
In March 1997, the representatives of the German Christian Democratic Party
declared that, "The European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization
project Turkey has no place." 140 German Chancellor Kohl's reported claim that the EU is
based on Christian Principles and cannot accommodate countries that do not share this
identity echoes this argument.
141
Again recently in an conference in Belgium, German
MP Michael Glos declared that "Turkey has no place in the EU, and we are against
Turkey's membership in the EU. Culturally and ideologically Turkey is different, for that
reason and also Turkey's strategic location it is better to give Turkey a special status
within the Union." And Turkish State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz
responded by saying "We can not change our religion just because you say so. Turkey
wants be a part of the EU. We do not want any special status or to be a special member of
lj8
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" Turkey's cultural differences are the hidden obstacles for accession of
Turkey into the EU.
The most obvious example of Turkey's treatment by Europeans as an outsider is
the visa regime of the EU members. Virtually all of the European countries including
Russia demand visas from Turkish citizens before entering these countries (see Table 6
on page 84).
143 The EU*s visa free zone includes all of Western Europe, three Baltic
States and the Central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Hungary).
The rest of the Balkans, Turkey and Russia stay out. Similarly, Russia's visa-free zone
includes all of the Eastern Europeans (former allies of the Soviet Union), the EU
members and Turkey stay out. This shows that only the western Slavs of Eastern Europe,
that are predominantly Catholic, enjoy the privilege of being welcome visa-free in both
the EU and Russia, while Turkey stays out in both. 145 The impossibility of placing
Turkey in Europe is part of the European Union's problem of what to do with Turkey.
The perception of Turks as the Other of Europe is deeply embedded in the European
collective memory, and despite many internal hostilities among the Europeans
themselves, they can find in Turkey a common 'Other'. 146
The big change occurred in the 1920s with the westernization process of Turkey
as a formal and fundamental policy under Kemal Ataturk. From this point on Turkey has
directed her energies towards, "westernization," of which membership in the EU would
be the climax. However, after 1980s, the forced and by the time voluntary westernization
4
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began to collide with the traditional Islamic lifestyles within Turkey. A considerable part
of the Turkish people and some intellectuals consider the relations between the EU and
Turkey as weak and unsolvable puzzle because of the differences between two cultures.
B. TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM
1. Turkey Greece Relations
Beyond the big non-agreement on the division of Cyprus. Turkey and Greece
have other on going troubles. The major continuing problems between Turkey and
Greece, which need to be addressed, are particularly related to the Aegean. The relations
between Greece and Turkey deteriorated even further when the Turkish Army invaded
Northern Cyprus in 1974 as a result of failed Greek attempt to take over the control of the
whole island by Greek Cypriots with the support of Greek military junta.
At least since then, Greece has been convinced of Turkey's expansionist
intentions toward the whole Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean region. Turkey, on the
other hand, views the origin of conflicts primarily as a Greek attempt to enclose Turkey
by a Greek controlled maritime area, and thus considerably sensitive about its rights and
interests in the Aegean Sea. The loss of those rights and interests could block Turkey in a
very narrow coastal zone and diminish its control and rights in the Aegean.
One of the big concerns of Turkish leaders about the EU was and is its giving a
free hand to Greece to develop policies which were and are not in favor of Turkey. As a
full member of the Union, Greece blocked Turkey's application for membership and also
preventing the release of the financial aids, which were planned for the use of Turkey. 4
Besides, according to top officials and many intellectuals, Greece was the supporter of
14 McBnde. E., Survey: Turkey-Why are We Waiting?, The Economist, p. 6.
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Kurdish terrorist action in Turkey's Southeast region by supplying training bases in
i 10
Cyprus and Greece. Moreover three Greek ministers resigned from their offices
because of their controversial role in the capture of Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish security
units in Kenya.
After the devastating Earthquake in Turkey and later in Greece in August 1999,
the relations between two countries began to improve. The solid results of this thaw are
some agreements between two countries on so called soft issues, like tourism, culture,
environment and combating organized crime (illegal immigration, drug trafficking and
terrorism). However, the main problems are waiting to be addressed in the future. These
problems are the breadth of territorial waters in Aegean Sea, control of the Aegean Sea
airspace, militarization of Eastern Aegean Islands by Greece, delimitation of the
continental self line in the Aegean Sea and exploration rights to any natural resources in
the continental shelf and islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean Sea, which both countries
claim. Greece does not want Turkey to join the EU or benefit from its financial aids
before those problems are solved, certainly in favor of Greek benefits. However, an
opportunity now exists to make the most of this opening for the greater good of strategic
stability on Europe's Eastern Mediterranean doorstep.
European action could now be taken to help resolve the wider differences between
Greece and Turkey within NATO. The US has been continuing to press Greece and
Turkey to settle their disputes over the sovereignty of numerous islands in the Eastern
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Mediterranean before the International Court of Justice. Continued disputed sovereignty
over places such as the tiny islet of Kardak, (the Greek name Imia), is still the source of a
risk to open conflict.
The root of the Aegean problem is that Greece and Turkey have very different
points of view on the Aegean issues. The Greek side argues that international treaties are
the prevailing factors in the disputes. Greece regards Turkey as following an aggressive
policy that does not acknowledge the Greek sovereignty and rights and the legal status
quo in the Aegean. 1 ° Greece argues that the status quo of Lausanne Treaty has somewhat
changed because of subsequent agreements and international treaties, and Turkey
intentionally is ignoring the fundamental provisions of international law in making its
unilateral claims. Greece also implies that there is actually only one problem in the
Aegean Sea, that of the delimitation of the continental shelf. The other disputes including
territorial waters, control of airspace, and demilitarization of Eastern Aegean Islands are
being addressed by existing international law, and therefore not really even under dispute.
Turkey, on the other hand, states that the Aegean sea and airspace over it is a
common entity that should be shared between the two countries and that both countries
should respect each other's vital interests. Turkey insists that the status quo set by the
Lausanne Treaty is still valid, where both countries equally have limited maritime
jurisdiction and rest of the sea is for mutual use. The Turkish side points out that any
newly established treaty or regulation that Turkey is not part of can not change the status
quo in favor of one side in the Aegean. Turkey also states that Greece is trying to
150
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undermine Turkish security by controlling the Aegean, that Greece disregards Turkey's
fundamental rights and interests in the Aegean Sea.
The problems in the Aegean Sea must be resolved for the stability and peace in
the southern flank of the Europe. Turkey's long lasting EU membership issue would pass
an important obstacle, and reduce the tensions and improve overall economic and
political well being of the countries within the EU.
2. The Cyprus Problem
Although Turkey always declares that the problems in Cyrus are not part of its
relations with the EU, the EU has made it clear that the divided status of the island is a
serious obstacle before Turkey's accession into the EU. Moreover, the application of
Cyprus for membership and the accession talks with Cyprus have been another
contentious aspect of the EU's relationship with Turkey. The decision to press ahead with
them in the face of Ankara's protests has made for a volatile mix of diplomatic rhetoric
about the impending consequences of the EU's negotiations with the Greek Cypriot
regime. This consequence was compounded by the serious diplomatic crisis over the
proposed deployment of Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles to the island, which
were the source of continued friction between Greece and Turkey in 1998.
Cyprus, because of its location, is also important for the security of Turkey's
southern rim and a key element in the defense of southern Anatolia. This includes the
security of the oil traffic that may start out of the Iskenderun Bay after the resumption of
oil delivery via the Iraq-Turkish pipeline, and also the completion of a new possible
pipeline between Azerbaijan and Turkey that will carry the Caspian oil to the European
Market. Greece's encirclement of Turkey, as seen by Turkish political and military
leadership, must be prevented from extending toward the east Mediterranean.
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The poor relations that have existed between Turkey and Greece have been a
constant focus of attention for NATO commands and the US, and the situation has not
been helped by Europe giving Cyprus fast-track status as a candidate in the accession
process. This could mean that Cyprus would be a full member of the EU in as little as
five years. Turkey has threatened that it will forge closer links with its affiliates in
northern Cyprus if the negotiations continue without Turkish Cypriot representation.
Turkey is determined to keep and protect its rights and obligations emanating from the
1960 treaties, and it will continue to oppose the membership of Cyprus politically and
legally prior to any solution in Cyprus. As in March 1995, the Turkish Foreign Minister
Murat Karayalcin declared, if the EU finalizes the accession of Cyprus despite Turkish
reactions, Turkey will be left with no option but to take steps toward achieving a similar
integration with the Turkish part of the island. 1 ' This position has been maintained until
now by the following governments in Turkey.
While it is too early to say that the new warmth of relations between Greece and
Turkey will have a tangible outcome on the issue of Cyprus, the EU could take a much
more pro-active stance. It is not enough just to be engaging in accession talks with the
Greek Cypriot regime in the vain hope that this may help to solve some of the difficulties
which divide the island and cause so much of the friction between Greece and Turkey.
The EU is now better able to influence Turkey's actions, by offering Turkey future
membership. Now, Turkey could be persuaded to put pressure on Rauf Denktash, leader
of the Turkish Cypriot regime, to adopt a more flexible approach to a Cypriot settlement.
So far, there is a feeling that the EU has been driven more by Greek pressure from within
than by a well-defined Cyprus policy of its own. Besides, the Greek government made it
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clear that no Greek parliament will ratify the accession of Poland if the EU has not first
admitted Cyprus. It is Greece that is trying to determine the accession schedule of Cyprus
by using its membership rights as a kind of threat against the other members. At various
times Greece also made other threats, including the blocking of all external actions of the
152
union.
The perception of the larger European states is that the government of Cyprus is
not serious in attempting to reach a settlement with the Turkish Cypriots. At one level
European Foreign Ministers have pressured the government of Cyprus to include
representatives of the Turkish side in the formal talks. Italy, France have both suggested
greater status for the Turkish Cypriot administration as necessarily being the people who
will continue to be the rulers of the Northern Cyprus. 153 A more significant aspect of the
issue is that government of Cyprus wants to go alone in the road to the EU membership.
The government of Cyprus seeks immediate accession prior to any settlement in Cyprus,
which in turn would strengthen its hands in the future negotiations. However, in his
recent declaration Denktash once more stated that, ". . .a new basis should be created, then
we will reconsider it. The basis is that Greek Cypriots do not alone represent Cyprus." 154
The talks between the leaders of the communities are ongoing, and gradually the
international community is accepting the Turkish Cypriots more as an equal
administration in the Cyprus.
1 5 The proposal of Denktash to establish a confederation
based on equal sovereignty of both communities is getting more positive reflections after
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the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia and Caucasus.
156
However, the Greek Cypriot regime
recently declared that Greek Cypriots would never accept a confederation solution. 15 '
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157 M2 Presswire, "Republic Cyprus: Cyprus Government will never Accept a Confederal Solution,
Coventry, 14 November 2000.
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IV. MUTUAL BENEFITS OF TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE
EU FOR TURKEY AND THE EU
Turkey is anxious to gain membership in the EU as quickly as possible, primarily
for the benefits the country hopes to reap in terms of economy, support for
democratization, and an undisputable place within European order and civilization. On
the other hand, the EU is offering Turkey the membership due to Turkey's geo-strategic
position as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East, and Turkey's potential as a core
Islamic state in the region.
A. TURKISH BENEFITS FROM EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP
EU membership would definitely have an effect on the stagnating identity
problem of Turkey by accepting Turkey into the European society. This new status could
obviously help and enforce the westem-minded elite in Turkey with respect to Islamist
and Oriental-minded groups to carry on the westernization movement of country in terms
of European standards.
The emergence of the new Turkic Republics in Central Asia and Trans-Caucasus,
the rebirth of Turkey's awareness of its ethnic and cultural ties with populations in the
Balkans (as a result of the conflicts in Yugoslavia), and a revival of Islam which has a
potential influence in Turkish culture are all causing a redefinition of Turkish identity in
the eyes of Turkish citizens and the international community at large. EU membership
would act as symbol of acceptance of Turkey as a European country. However, the
assimilation of Turkish culture into European culture will depend on the definition of
exactly what comprises a "European identity." Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem
stated at General Affairs Council, in September 1999 at Brussels:
ol
We consider ourselves both European and Asian.
..if being European is a
"historical" or "geographical" definition, we live and we have lived 700
years of our histon' in Europe, and a European power... If being
European is defined by religious criteria, then the setting might not be
appropriate. But if "European culture " is defined, as it is by the EU, that
is, mainly by factors such as "democracy, human rights, gender equality,
rule of law and secularism" than in spite of the needfor further progress
on some points, we have shared and contributed to this contemporarv
— 1 SR
'
"European Culture "for 75 years.
As Cem stated, if European identity is defined in terms of geography and political
common values, then the Turkish population will have the chance to adapt itself to the
European norms in order to transition into the international community as a European
country. The acceptance of Turkey as a European country and Turks as Europeans would
diminish the role and influence of Oriental and Islamic based factors in Turkish identity.
By joining the EU as a full member, Turkey could benefit from the EU's
economic support, which the union is using to help developing the political and economic
infrastructure of the countries in need.
Currently, trade between Turkey and the EU forms 50 percent of Turkey's
imports and exports (see Table 5 on page 83). Previously, Turkish exports primarily
consisted of agricultural products, but Turkey's exportations of industrial products have
increased dramatically within the past ten years. The creditability of Turkey in
international money markets will be positively affected with its entrance to the union.
Good creditability in international money markets will likely enable Turkey to develop
8
Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's speech at General Affairs Council, September 13, 1999,
Brussels, in Bac, Meltem M., The Impact of European Union on Turkish Politics, East European
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new sources of income as well as increase foreign investment in Turkey, which is now as
low as 0.5 percent of Turkey's GDP (see Table 3B on page 81). 159
The EU is also encouraging Turkey to create a functioning market economy that
will survive competitively amongst the pressures and market forces of the EU. The
Copenhagen requirements (and thus, the EU) have already had positive influences for
Turkey even prior to its admission. Because of the Copenhagen Criteria, the Turkish
government is trying to amend new regulations and reforms to meet the membership
requirements in the economical area. A stable and well functioning market economy that
meets the EU regulations will be a crucial goal for Turkey's short-term policies. The
devastating inflation rates of 1990's are coming down from 100s to 40 percent levels.
According to September 2000 data, the inflation rate has come to the level of 49 percent
in consumer prices.
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The European Union has been very influential in prompting fundamental changes
in Turkey's democratization process. This influence is very likely to go on for the next
reforms and changes in the same area by the time. The EU wields great power over its
potential members, with incentives such as financial aid, the promise of membership, and
institutional guidance to strengthen democracy and economy. The increasing strength of
Turkish civil society and the growing demands from the people for more democratic
government are also influential in this restructuring.
In Turkey's case, the EU has mainly pushed for political changes. The political
criteria for membership require a functioning democracy with secure and intact political
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institutions. Given the current political context, Turkey hardly meets the criteria.
Nevertheless, Turkey's desire for EU membership is so strong that the government is
trying to implement reforms by simply saying, "the EU wants them." The Turkish
government's use of the EU to manipulate public opinion about certain reforms appears to
be an effective tool. In the 1990s, after the Customs Union with the EU, Turkish
perception was that the Union would help Turkey foster democratization.
Moreover, EU membership could also have some effects on Kurdish issue. EU
membership, if skillfully managed, could help resolve the ongoing Kurdish conflict.
Because the EU requires candidates to meet the Union's democratic criteria, including
granting political and cultural rights for minorities, Turkey's official membership status
has strong potential to ease the tensions in southeastern Turkey. Although the Turkish
Constitution does not recognize the Kurds as a minority, recognition of their rights will
likely follow the implementation of all democratic norms of the EU.
In addition, many leading Kurds inside and outside Turkey including the leader of
PKK Abdullah Ocalan have changed their views about an independent Kurdish state. 1 '
Those Kurds are not calling for independence, even autonomy, but rather a Kurdish
community with full social, cultural and political rights. The candidacy status of Turkey
in the EU and the capture of Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish security forces both have great
importance on the change of policies in the Kurdish side.
Apparently, an independent, landlocked, poor, economically insufficient
Kurdistan would be no help to its citizens. Moreover it would have to deal with the huge
Pope, H., Turkey Tones Down Feud With Greece, But EU Membership Has New Obstacle, Wall Street
Journal; New York; 13 March 2000. Available online: [http://proquest.urru.com/pqdweb.hrrn ]. Accessed on
22 August 2000.
64
uncertainties of the region and also inner conflicts among Kurds. 162 On the other hand, a
Turkey in the EU could also carry the Kurds to the Europe as well, and as a region the
southeastern part of Turkey one day might enjoy the benefits of the Union, such as in the
case of Northern Ireland ofUK or the Basque region of Spain.
Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the present Article 6 of the Treaty is amended to
enshrine a constitutional principle that the EU is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law. 163 If
Turkey wants take part as a member in this organization, then Turkey has no alternative
other than to adopt these principles.
There is no strong alternative for Turkey other than the EU in the region. The
leadership of the Middle East was never regarded as a major goal for Turkey. During
World War I, the declaration of Islamic Holy war (Jihad) against European powers by the
then Sultan and the Caliph of the Ottoman Empire found no response from the Islamic
nations of the Middle East. On the contrary, many Arab emirates had cooperated with
British and French soldiers to fight against the Turkish forces. 164 Moreover, Turkey's
political and economical relations are tied mainly to Europe rather than the Middle East.
Today, some politicians and pro Islamic groups are still pursuing this goal in
Turkey. However, Turkey could be in a better position with its relations within the
region, if it becomes a full member of the EU. Integration of Turkey into Europe in terms
of political, economical, and security areas would definitely increase its creditability and
leadership position in the region it occupies.
162 The Kurds, an Ancient Tragedy, The Economist, p. 50, London, 20 February 2000.
163 EU Documents, Treaty on European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, p.
13. Available onlme:[http://europa.eu.mt/eur-lex/en/treaties/mdex.hrml]. Accessed on 24 November 2000.
164 Andrew Mango, Ataturk, p. 164, 179, 180.
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Turkey's other important tie with the West is its relationship with the US. The US
government supports Turkish membership in the EU. During 1988 to 1999 senior
diplomats from the US were engaged in an intense effort for the inclusion of Turkey by
the EU.
16
" However, US interests in the region, where Turkey is located are somewhat
different than the EU. Turkey's relations with the US are mainly based on geo-strategic
considerations. Despite the ups and downs of this relationship, Turkey's support was
important in an area where US commitments were complicated by its dependency on oil
and its policy of supporting Israel. 16
Another aspect of US-Turkey relations is the balancing effect of this relationship
against Russia-Iran cooperation. Russia and Iran have well-developed relations and
cooperation particularly in the military realm. After the deterioration ofUS -Iran
relations, the vacuum formed by the US' absence was filled by Russia. The three
countries, Russia, Iran and Turkey are competing, especially in controlling and
influencing the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. The apparent US support behind Turkey
led Russia to form a secret alliance with Iran by creating very close relations.
In the areas of military and technology, Russia is providing Iran high-tech know-
how and military equipment. Recently, Russia revealed its intentions to withdraw from
1995 Arms -Sales Deal negotiated with the US. 167 The deal was limiting Russian sales of
tanks and other conventional weapons to Iran. The active role of Turkey during the Gulf
Crisis enhanced this position.
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Turkey, by soliciting membership to the EU, is clearly demonstrating a desire to
take part in the newly emerging security and defense system of Europe. Although the
threat from the Soviet Union has dissipated, new sources of potential warfare (which
would involve Turkey due to its proximity) have emerged as a result of the conflicts of
various scales in Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans.
The potentially explosive situation calls into question the effectiveness of existing
strategic alliances in the face of new security challenges. Could Turkey, a NATO
member, rely on its Western Alliances in any threat against its security while the EU is
forming its own defense system? The European Union defense ministers have agreed to
commit personnel and equipment to a military force intended to enable EU countries to
unite in response to any threat to the alliance's interests. According to recent
developments, the ministers ofEU member states had agreed to provide a pool of
1 00,000 personnel, 400 combat planes and 1 00 warships to make up the Euro Rapid
Reaction Force - which would be a maximum of 60,000-strong at any one time.
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION BENEFITS FROM TURKISH MEMBERSHIP
Because Turkey's geographic location poses threats but at the same time promises
potential for international security, Turkey-EU relations are critical in terms of strategic
defense considerations. At the crossroads of two major continents and the center of an
unstable political environment, Turkey could play a key role in stopping radical Islamic
movements, and resolving other problems in Caucasus, Middle East and the Balkans. As
Gunter Verheugen, European Commissioner for enlargement, stated, "The EU did not
grant Turkey its candidate status out of charity. Europe is following a strategy that
BBC News, EU ministers approve army plan Monday, 20 November, 2000, 17:24 GMT.
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envisages the crucial rule, the strategic importance of Turkey for the security of Europe
and security of the Western Alliance. It is in our interest to make sure that Turkey is
firmly anchored in the family of Western democracies and nations." 169
From the perspective that Turkey sits at the edge of three distinct regions of
conflict, (the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus), Turkey plays the role of an
insulator in all of the security regions surrounding it, and will also play a peripheral role
in any battles that take place in those regions.
170
Therefore, it is in the EU's best interest
to ally itself strongly with Turkey, as Turkey is clearly in a position to make a significant
contribution to the stability and security of Europe.
Turkey also has a very unique location that could connect the main fossil energy
sources of both Middle East and Central Asia to Europe. The oil reserves in Central Asia
and the Caspian Sea region are another source of the EU's interest in Turkey. The fact
that Turkey is located on the route planned for a 1080-mile oil pipeline, between
Azerbaijan and Turkey, makes this country even more economically attractive. Although
some obstacles remain, the officials of countries and oil industry representatives seemed
convinced in an oil gas conference in November 2000, in Paris that the line is quite likely
to proceed.
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The US and Turkish officials have consistently stated that the pipeline is
the best way to avoid the increasing number of tankers passing through the crowded and
treacherous Turkish Straits. The US government has continued since the beginning to
push the project as a way of providing a new route that could diminish the role of Russia
and Iran and eventually weaken their influences in the entire region.
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The EU could benefit from Turkish membership in the area of new economic
markets. With its growing economy and emerging middle class, Turkey is becoming a
valuable market for the EU products. With the increasing capacity of the Turkish
economy and a population of 65-million, Turkey could contribute a great deal to the
common market of the EU. Although the purchasing capacity of the population is not at a
satisfactory level, the newly emerging Turkish middle class has been demanding every
new modern convenience or technological advance to emerge. Virtually every socio-
economic class wants to own goods such as washing machine, color television,
refrigerator, and a car. Computers are very common through out the country, and
particularly in the west.
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Throughout 1 990s, the telecommunication system developed rapidly, and Internet
usage dramatically increased. As the survey of the Economist indicates, even in the
illegally built houses in the districts of big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, people have
running water, electricity, telephones, refrigerators and televisions. The survey also
points out. "Over the course of two or three generations, Turkey is turning the penniless
Anatolian peasant into petty bourgeois."
Turkey has a relatively young population and a higher population growth rate in
comparison to current EU members and the other candidates (see Table 2 on page 79).
Aging European countries need eager and dynamic youthful workers. A cheap labor
172
McBride, E., Survey: Turkey- Last Line of Defense and Why are We Waiting?, The Economist, p. 6,




Clark, B., The Keystone of Europe, para. 5.
69
force is still a big need inside the EU. Currently, 29 percent of Turkey's population is
under 14 years old, and 65 percent of the population is between the ages of 15 to 65.' 7;
EU membership of Turkey could enable the EU to become more effective on
Turkey's domestic and international affairs. After Turkey's accession into the Union, the
EU could put more pressure on Turkey to create policies to settle problems in Turkey's
international and domestic affairs. As in the case of Austria, when the EU had imposed
sanctions on Austria as a response to the entrance of far right Freedom Party into the
coalition government, the EU could also persuade Turkey to comply with certain socio-
political norms, and to settle long-lasting conflicts with Greece. 176 Because Turkey will
have to meet EU requirements both in domestic and international domains, membership
in the EU will entail that Turkey surrender a considerable amount of sovereignty rights to
the Union.
175 CIA. World Factbook 2000-Turkey.
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Turkey's eligibility for candidacy and subsequent accession into the EU is a
complex issue. As long as the EU upholds its policy that the candidates must meet
accession criteria prior to negotiations, given the current economic, political and social
circumstances in Turkey, Turkey's accession requires more time then Turkish
government and society expected. The EU has stated the rules for the EU membership
very clearly. If the EU is convinced that Turkey has not met the criteria, then the EU will
not initiate accession negotiations with Turkey, regardless of Turkey's qualifications as
officially noted in EU documents. The only obvious benefit of candidacy status for
Turkey is that Turkey will be able to access the financial aid of the EU for helping the
candidates to align their economic and political infrastructure according to EU norms.
This could also be the restatement of Turkey's acceptance as a "European" country.
As compared to many Islamic countries in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central
Asia, the democratic and economic structure of Turkey seems to be a success in terms of
having met western criteria for democracy and a market economy. Indeed, most of the
Middle East states are religious oriented, more or less autocratic regimes with less respect
for rule of law and human rights. However, when comparing Turkey with western
countries, Turkey's success falls short.
Nevertheless, if Turkey is to meet the Copenhagen Criteria for membership, then
Turkey must adopt new regulations to grant more political rights for all its citizens,
including the Kurds, and must succeed in establishing a strong market economy that
meets the EU norms.
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Contrary to popular belief, the EU does not have any visions of dividing Turkey
on the basis of its ethnic origins, and the EU has reiterated its views on the issue several
times in its reports. However, the lingering questions about minority rights have been
perceived by many officials and politicians as a serious danger for the unitary status of
the state. Moreover. Turkey has perceived the EU's statements on Turkey's shortcomings
about its eligibility as a discriminatory act. Nevertheless, addressing and working towards
changing EU's negative perceptions of Turkey should be regarded as a secondary
priority—one to be reckoned with only when the necessary reforms that help build
democracy, economy and social and cultural rights in Turkey have been successfully
implemented.
More critical priorities include Turkey's domestic infrastructure, which does not
provide a suitable situation to commence key radical political reforms. The political
diversion in coalition government, corruption in state institutions, military influence in
political affairs, radical Islamic action, Kurdish issue prevents the necessary reforms from
being implemented.
In addition to addressing domestic concerns, the long lasting disputes with Greece
and Cyprus problem will continue to affect Turkey EU relations. The disputes between
Greece and Turkey appear to be unsolvable in the immediate future. Any change in the
Status quo in the Aegean Sea would be very dangerous in the sense that such a change
could provoke tensions between Turkey and Greece. Both prior to and after Turkey's
accession into the EU, the disputes between Greece and Turkey can be frozen for a time
until a mutual confidence and understanding emerges between the parties. A period of
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freezing the problems (whatever the length of the time period is) would definitely be
better than any serious conflict between Greece and Turkey.
Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a democratic
system exist in Turkey, Turkey's political system still does not meet the Copenhagen
political criteria. There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection
of minorities. Torture is not systematic, but still widespread, and freedom of expression is
regularly restricted by the authorities. The National Security Council continues to play a
major role in political life. Although there have been some improvements in terms of the
independence of the judiciary, the state of emergency court system remains in place.
In recent months encouraging signs of democratization have been emerging. The
government and Parliament have worked to adopt some keys laws regulating political
life, the justice system and protection of human rights. It is too early to assess the impact
of these measures, but these efforts should be pursued and extended to all citizens,
including those of Kurdish origin.
Turkey has many of the characteristics of a market economy. Turkey's economy
should be able to cope, albeit with difficulties, with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union, (provided that sustainable macroeconomic stability is attained
and there is further progress towards the implementation of legal and structural reform
programs.) Turkey has continued its debt consolidation policies, and economic
imbalances have been reduced. The public deficit and inflation have been reduced.
Pension reform has been approved by parliament. The efficiency of revenue collection
procedures has been improved. The constitution has been changed to permit international
arbitration.
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Despite tremendous obstacles, neither Turkey nor the EU can afford to break
away from each other. A Turkey with EU membership would be more influential in the
region as a politically and economically strong and stable country. Vice versa, a rejected
and even insulted Turkey would be unlikely to establish a leadership for itself in the
Middle East, nor in the Black Sea, since its relationships with other countries in the
region are rather shaky. The possible conflicts in the region where Turkey lays and any
domestic conflicts inside Turkey could highly affect the stability and peace in southern
Europe as well.
Turkey could be a stabilizer in Europe's most volatile corners: Trans-Caucasus,
Central Asia and the turbulent Balkans. Instability in this area is due to economic
underdevelopment, poverty linked to excessive population growth, a lack of a working
democracy and the power of Islamic fundamentalism. Turkey is at the center of this
crescent, and could play a key role as a model to these states that it is possible for an
Islamic country to become a prosperous and modernized democracy. Turkey's accession
into EU is vital for both parties to handle the destabilizing factors on the Southeast border
of Europe, to improve Turkish political and economical life, and to create cooperation
based on Turkish and EU's capabilities.
Turkey does have problems, which need to be addressed, but they need be no
more difficult than those which other aspiring EU members must surmount. Likewise,
Turkey has made tangible progress in the areas it has been asked to address, and eagerly
awaits more realistic recognition of its efforts to join the EU. In the wake of last year's
earthquakes which made Turkey particularly economically vulnerable, the opportunity to
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maximize relations with Greece should be made to redirect Turkey towards a Western
identity, and nurture its potential as a future European state.
It is up to the EU to acknowledge Turkey's progress and give credit for its
allegiance to the West, and Europe in particular. If Turkey is qualified to defend Europe,
then it is qualified to be European. The modern state of Turkey has yearned to belong to
the West and conducted itself in Western ways in looking out for its best interests, so
much so that its destiny should lie soundly within Europe as a European country.
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APPENDIX
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TABLES FOR 12 EU CANDIDATES AND
TURKEY
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Bulgaria 110.91 8.21 32.73 3995
Cyprus 9.25 0.67 10.20 14535
Czech Republic 78.87 10.28 109.40 10625
Estonia 45.23 1.44 9.18 6630
Hungary 93.03 10.07 91.89 9095
Latvia 64.59 2.43 11.82 4930
Lithuania 65.30 3.70 19.47 5270
Malta 0.30 0.40 5.52 11730
Poland 312.69 38.65 256.62 6630
Romania 238.39 22.46 108.97 4845
Slovakia 49.04 5.40 47.26 8755
Slovenia 20.27 1.99 25.50 12750
Turkey 774.82 64.33 322.49 5015
TheEU
Total/Average








1862.67 170.03 1051.20 6182
Overall Total/Average 4523.67 526.03 8573.20 16294
Sources from the EU Regular Reports on Candidates Progress towards Accession for the
year 2000 and for the EU members' data from CIA World Factbook for Countries.
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Bulgaria 8.21 -1.2 8.1 1.1
Cyprus 0.67 0.6 13.3 1.9
Czech Republic 10.28 -0.1 9.1 1.2
Estonia 1.44 -0.6 8.5 1.2
Hungary 10.07 -0.3 8.1 1.3
Latvia 2.43 -0.8 7.8 1.1
Lithuania 3.70 -0.3 9.8 1.3
Malta 0.40 0.7 12.8 1.9
Poland 38.65 0.0 10.1 1.4
Romania 22.46 -0.2 10.8 1.4
Slovakia 5.40 0.1 10.0 1.3
Slovenia 1.99 0.1 9.4 1.3
Turkey 64.33 1.3 18.7 2.0








170.03 0.4 13.1 1.6
Sources from CIA World Factbook 2000, Populations from the EU Regular Reports on
Candidates Progress towards Accession for the year 2000.
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Bulgaria 32.73 3995 2.4 17.3 26.8 55.9
Cyprus 10.20 14535 4.5 4.2 21.1 74.7
Czech
Republic
109.40 10625 -0.2 3.7 41.8 54.5
Estonia 9.18 6630 -1.1 5.7 25.3 69




Latvia 11.82 4930 0.1 4.0 27.6 68.4
Lithuania 19.47 5270 -4.1 8.8 31.1 60.1
Malta 5.52 11730 4.0 3 26.0 71.0
Poland 256.62 6630 4.2 3.8 36.6 59.6
Romania 108.97 4845 -3.2 15.5 36.3 48.2
Slovakia 47.26 8755 1.9 4.5 35.1 60.4
Slovenia 25.50 12750 4.9 3.6 37.5 58.9




7522.000 21000 2.6 n/a n/a n/a
Sources from the EU Regular Reports on Candidates Progress towards Accession for the
year 2000 and the EU members' data from CIA World Factbook 2000
Note 1 : Including Construction
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Bulgaria 2.6 0.2 6.1
Cyprus 1.3 -5.5(1998) 2.1 (1998)
Czech Republic 2.0 -1.6 9.1
Estonia 4.6 -4.6 4.6
Hungary 10.0 -3.7 2.9
Latvia 2.4 -3.9 5.8
Lithuania 0.8 -3.4(1998) 4.5
Malta 2.1 n/a 3.4(1998)
Poland 7.2 -2.7 4.3
Romania 45.8 -4.4(1997) 2.4
Slovakia 10.6 -0.6 3.7
Slovenia 6.1 -0.6 0.2




Sources from the EU Regular Reports on Candidates Progress towards Accession for the
year 2000, and the EU members' data from CIA World Factbook 2000
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Bulgaria 8.21 17.0 26.6 29.1 44.3
Cyprus 0.67 3.6 9.3 22.3 68.4
Czech
Republic
10.28 8.7 5.2 40.1 54.6
Estonia 1.44 11.7 8.8 31.8 59.4
Hungary 10.07 7.0 7.1 34.0 58.9
Latvia 2.43 14.5 15.3 26.0 58.7
Lithuania 3.70 14.1 20.2 26.9 52.9
Malta 0.40 5.5 5.0 24.0 71.0
Poland 38.65 12.5 18.1 31.4 50.5
Romania 22.46 6.8 41.7 27.6 30.7
Slovakia 5.40 16.2 7.4 38.4 54.2
Slovenia 1.99 7.6 10.2 38.5 51.3
Turkey 64.33 7.6 41.3 22.7 35.7
TheEU 356.00 10.0 n/a n/a n/a
Sources from the EU Regular Reports on Candidates Progress towards Accession for the
year 2000.
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Exports with EU (In
Percent of Total)
Imports with EU
(In Percent of Total)
Bulgaria 32.73 52.6 48.6
Cyprus 10.20 50.7 57.3
Czech Republic 109.40 69.2 64.0
Estonia 9.18 72.7 65.0
Hungary 91.89 76.2 64.4
Latvia 11.82 62.5 54.5
Lithuania 19.47 50.1 49.7
Malta 5.52 n/a n/a
Poland 256.62 70.5 64.9
Romania 108.97 65.5 60.4
Slovakia 47.26 59.4 51.7
Slovenia 25.50 66.0 68.6
Turkey 322.49 52.6 53.9
Sources from the EU Regular Reports on Candidates Progress towards Accession for the
year 2000.
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Table 6: The Visa Policy in Europe
Country- Name The EU Visa Russian Visa 12 Candidates' Visa
Russia Required n/a Required
Turkey Required Required Required
Bulgaria Required Not Required Not Required
Romania Required Not Required Not Required
Czech Republic Not Required Not Required Not Required
Hungary Not Required Not Required Not Required
Poland Not Required Not Required Not Required
Slovakia Not Required Not Required Not Required
Slovenia Not Required Not Required Not Required
Estonia Not Required Required Not Required
Latvia Not Required Required Not Required
Lithuania Not Required Required Not Required
The EU 1 5 Members n/a Required Not Required
Sources from: Michael Emerson, "Redrawing the Map ofEurope", p. 17, New York, St.
Martin's Press Inc. 1998.
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Table 7: The Results in Last Four Parliamentary Elections in Percent of Total Votes
in Turkey
Name of Political Party
Election Years and Results (In Percent of Total Votes)
1987 1991 1995 1999
Motherland Party 36.31 24.01 19.65 13.22
True Path Party 19.14 27.03 19.18 12.01
Democratic Left Party 8.53 10.75 14.64 22.19
Republican People's Party 24.74 (Note 1) 20.75 (Note 1) 10.71 8.71
Nationalist Action Party 2.93 (Note 2) (Note 3) 8.18 17.98
Welfare Party 7.16 16.88 21.38 15.41 (Note 4)
Note 1 : In 1987 and 1991 elections the Republican People's party was originally
represented within Social Democratic Populist Party
Note 2: In 1987 elections the name of the party was Nationalist Working Party.
Note 3: This party entered the elections within True Path Party as a cooperating partner
and after the elections the winning MPs turned back to their party.
Note 4:The Welfare Party was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1997, now the
Virtue Party is in mainstream Turkish politics as the successor of Welfare Party.
Sources: From the statistical election reports of Cumhuriyet (A Turkish Daily
Newspaper). Available online: [http//secim.cumhuriyet.com.tr/raporlar/miloy87.cfm
(miloy91.cfm, miloy95.cfm, miloy99.cfm)]
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Table 8: The Human Sufferings in Terrorist Fighting in Southeastern Turkey
(Between Dates: 19 July 1987 - 31 September 2000)
Group Name Dead Wounded
Military Forces 3,654 8,529
Police Forces 190 655
Village Guards 1,177 1,821
Government Employed 307 204
Civilian People 4,447 5,448
Terrorists 23,342 620
Total 33,117 17,277
Sources from the Documents of Governorship to the State of Emergency Legislation in
Southeastern Turkey. Available online [http://www.ohal.gov.tr/f_tarihce.htm]
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